Research
My dissertation develops a novel framework for understanding how moral considerations might bear on our epistemic practices. I propose that certain epistemic statuses (e.g., being a testifier, being an expert) ground a moral entitlement to a kind of respect. This respect in turn provides others with a pro tanto moral reason to believe the things we say.
Current Projects
please feel free to email me for drafts!
[title redacted] - under review → a paper arguing that there is moral reason, on pain of disrespect, to accept testimony from anyone in the absence of countervailing evidence.
[title redacted] - under review → a paper arguing that there is moral reason to lower confidence in response to the discovery of peer disagreement.
[title redacted] - under review → a paper arguing that there is moral reason to assign significant weight to expert testimony, grounded in respect for their track record of reliability. 
[title redacted] - under review → a paper arguing that extant accounts of gaslighting either fail to adequately emphasize the internal felt experience of the gaslit or do so in such a way that ignores its strongly affective character.
"Loving, Ex Post Facto" - in preparation → a paper arguing that in loving some present X, we necessarily love at least some of X's unknown past-selves, where "unknown past-selves" refers to iterations of X that existed before we knew them.
Sketchier Projects
"Saving the Appearances" → a paper arguing that we should countenance widespread conflict between the ethical and the epistemic, provided that we conceive of the demands of both domains as non-maximizing and non-overriding.
"Don't Feed the Trolls!" → a paper providing a conceptual analysis of Internet trolls. Argues that although there are strong reasons against engaging with trolls as if they are sincere, there is no fully generalizable norm for responding to trolling attempts.
Reviews
Review of Thomas Kelly's Bias, Journal of Moral Philosophy (forthcoming)
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