Research
My dissertation develops a novel framework for understanding how moral considerations might bear on our epistemic practices. I propose that certain epistemic statuses (e.g., being a testifier, being an expert) ground a moral entitlement to a kind of respect. This respect in turn provides others with a pro tanto moral reason to believe the things we say.
Current Projects
please feel free to email me for drafts!
please feel free to email me for drafts!
[title redacted] - under review
I argue that listeners have a moral duty to believe testimony, on pain of disrespect, unless they have independent reasons to think that the testifier is not credible. What typically entitles a person to standard-issue respect is having the capacity for practical reasoning (agency and norm-responsiveness). I show that the capacity for theoretical reasoning also involves agency and norm-responsiveness, and thus is structurally isomorphic to the capacity for practical reasoning. This therefore plausibly grounds an entitlement to a specifically epistemic type of respect: an entitlement to be treated as a rational agent. Per Tyler Burge (1995), because testifiers are rational agents, we are epistemically justified in accepting their testimony if we lack countervailing evidence. Thus, to treat someone as a rational agent is to believe their testimony by default, and because rational agents are morally entitled to be treated as such, testifiers are morally entitled to have their testimony believed by default.
I argue that listeners have a moral duty to believe testimony, on pain of disrespect, unless they have independent reasons to think that the testifier is not credible. What typically entitles a person to standard-issue respect is having the capacity for practical reasoning (agency and norm-responsiveness). I show that the capacity for theoretical reasoning also involves agency and norm-responsiveness, and thus is structurally isomorphic to the capacity for practical reasoning. This therefore plausibly grounds an entitlement to a specifically epistemic type of respect: an entitlement to be treated as a rational agent. Per Tyler Burge (1995), because testifiers are rational agents, we are epistemically justified in accepting their testimony if we lack countervailing evidence. Thus, to treat someone as a rational agent is to believe their testimony by default, and because rational agents are morally entitled to be treated as such, testifiers are morally entitled to have their testimony believed by default.
[title redacted] - under review
The peer disagreement literature has focused on determining the rational response to the discovery that a peer disagrees with you. I argue that we should also focus on determining the moral response to peer disagreement. This is because we have a pro tanto moral reason to conciliate – lower confidence in our original belief – in cases of peer disagreement. First, I argue that open-mindedness (toward a peer) is morally virtuous, and that conciliating is a necessary condition for being open-minded. So in order to practice this moral virtue, you must conciliate with your peer. Then, I demonstrate that failing to conciliate with a peer is a moral wrong because it is a failure to accord them the respect they are due. I close by explaining the ramifications of my claim for the relationship between moral and epistemic norms and demonstrating why the moral reason to conciliate is pro tanto.
The peer disagreement literature has focused on determining the rational response to the discovery that a peer disagrees with you. I argue that we should also focus on determining the moral response to peer disagreement. This is because we have a pro tanto moral reason to conciliate – lower confidence in our original belief – in cases of peer disagreement. First, I argue that open-mindedness (toward a peer) is morally virtuous, and that conciliating is a necessary condition for being open-minded. So in order to practice this moral virtue, you must conciliate with your peer. Then, I demonstrate that failing to conciliate with a peer is a moral wrong because it is a failure to accord them the respect they are due. I close by explaining the ramifications of my claim for the relationship between moral and epistemic norms and demonstrating why the moral reason to conciliate is pro tanto.
[title redacted] - under review
Recent years have seen a veritable explosion of interest in 'gaslighting'. And although a great deal of the rising interest has occurred within strictly popular discourse, gaslighting is one of the rare topics that has enjoyed a parallel amount of interest in the philosophical domain. However, I contend that extant accounts of gaslighting fail in their extensional adequacy, and argue that this is because they are overly focused on what is going on in the head of the gaslighter — their intentions, biases, motivations. What we should be doing instead is primarily locating the conditions that make an act gaslighting in the head of the gaslit. I begin by assessing extant accounts and identifying problems with each, concluding that emphasizing the internal experience of the gaslighter leaves out vital features of the felt experience of being gaslit, which I argue is the most important element of gaslighting. I surmise from this that looking to the head of the gaslit is key, and I provide a novel analysis of gaslighting which puts the internal experience of the gaslit front and center.
Recent years have seen a veritable explosion of interest in 'gaslighting'. And although a great deal of the rising interest has occurred within strictly popular discourse, gaslighting is one of the rare topics that has enjoyed a parallel amount of interest in the philosophical domain. However, I contend that extant accounts of gaslighting fail in their extensional adequacy, and argue that this is because they are overly focused on what is going on in the head of the gaslighter — their intentions, biases, motivations. What we should be doing instead is primarily locating the conditions that make an act gaslighting in the head of the gaslit. I begin by assessing extant accounts and identifying problems with each, concluding that emphasizing the internal experience of the gaslighter leaves out vital features of the felt experience of being gaslit, which I argue is the most important element of gaslighting. I surmise from this that looking to the head of the gaslit is key, and I provide a novel analysis of gaslighting which puts the internal experience of the gaslit front and center.
Sketchier Projects
→ a paper arguing that we have a moral reason to defer to experts, grounded in respect for their track record of reliability.
→ a paper arguing that in loving some X, we necessarily love at least some of X's past-selves.
→ a paper arguing that we should countenance widespread conflict between the ethical and the epistemic, provided that we conceive of the demands of both domains as non-maximizing and non-overriding.